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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920830-CA 
v. i 
JAMES RONALD BELLO, i Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(i) (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the arresting officer have reasonable suspicion 
to stop and detain defendant's truck? 
This issue is one of fact, under which the trial 
court's findings will be reversed only if they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 826 and at 837-38 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (Utah App. 1992). But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 
13, 14-15 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction 
of error" standard in reversing trial court's reasonable 
suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Compare State v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42-43 (Utah App. 
1993) (Bench, J,, concurring, joing by Jackson, J.) (arguing that 
Mendoza's standard of review has not been altered by State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)), with State v. White, No, 
920194, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. June 23, 1993) (observing that 
Thurman, contrary to Mendoza, suggests a two step analysis for 
review of a trial court's reasonable suspicion determination; 
"the final determination of lawfulness of a detention or search 
is reviewed for correctness"). Factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or the appellate court reaches a "definite and firm 
conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the defendant voluntarily consent to the 
arresting officer's search of his truck? 
An appellate court reviews the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary for 
correctness; however, "[t]he trial court's underlying factual 
findings will not be set aside unless they are found to be 
clearly erroneous." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993). 
3. Was the officer's search of defendant's truck 
within the scope of defendant's consent? 
Scope of consent is a factual question, subject to the 
deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review. State v. 
Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah 1990); State v. Marshall, 791 
P.2d 880, 888-90 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
2 
1990). See also United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th 
Cir. 1990) ("Whether a search remains within the boundaries of 
the consent is a question of fact to be determined from the 
totality of the circumstances, and a trial court's findings will 
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.") cert, denied. Ill 
S.Ct. 2802 (1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(i) (1990) (R. 1). 
Defendant filed motions and supporting memorandums to 
suppress contraband seized from his vehicle during an 
investigatory traffic stop (R. 25-43, 53-58, 78-85). Following a 
suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion in 
a written Order (R. 71). Defendant filed a motion to reconsider 
(R. 102-08, 126), which was denied in an unsigned minute entry 
(R. 134). Thereafter, defendant filed a petition for permission 
to take an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress (R. 137) which was denied (as this Court's 
Order denying the petition does not appear in the record, a copy 
is reproduced in Addendum A). 
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Following a bench trial on April 30, 1992, defendant 
was convicted as charged (R. 194). However, on December 18, 
1992, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1992), the 
trial court reduced defendant's conviction one degree and 
sentenced him to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 
218). The trial court then stayed defendant's sentence during 
the pendency of this appeal (R. 218). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The trial court's Order denying the motion to suppress 
accurately recites the pertinent facts (R. 71-74) (a complete 
copy of the Order is contained in Addendum B). The court's 
factual findings are therefore reproduced here, adding citations 
to the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress: 
1. On March 5, 1991, at approximately 11:15 
a.m., Deputy Sheriff Barney, while traveling 
west on 1-70, observed an eastbound pickup 
truck driving with part of the vehicle in 
each of the two travel lanes (R. 226-28). 
2. Deputy Barney turned, activated his video 
recorder and pursued the vehicle to stop the 
vehicle and determine if the driver was under 
the influence of alcohol, drowsy or otherwise 
impaired. There was no erratic behavior by 
the [defendant's vehicle while being pursued 
(R. 229, 249-51, 271-72). 
3. Deputy Barney stopped the vehicle after 
catching up with the vehicle approximately 
two miles from the location of the first 
observation (R. 263). 
4. Deputy Barney advised the [d]efendant 
that he had been driving outside the regular 
lane of travel. Defendant acknowledged he 
had been having trouble controlling the 
vehicle due to the wind (R. 231). 
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5. Deputy Barney observed that the vehicle 
windshield was cracked and also determined 
that the [defendant's abilities were not 
impaired due to intoxication or drowsiness 
(R. 242, 252). 
6. The [d]efendant, upon request, provided a 
copy of the vehicle registration showing the 
owner to be Bobby Randall, dba AC Feed/Grain, 
31 Fano A. Arcadia, California 91006 (R. 230, 
242). 
7. Deputy Barney smelled marijuana when he 
approached the vehicle and again as he passed 
the camper portion of the pickup as he 
returned to his vehicle to issue a warning 
citation for a cracked windshield and weaving 
(R. 231-32, 242, 255). 
8. The officer requested that the dispatcher 
attempt to contact the owner of the vehicle; 
however, he was advised that there was no 
telephone listed for the owner (R. 233). 
9. Deputy Barney then returned to the 
subject vehicle and asked [d]efendant: "May 
I look in the vehicle?" (R. 234, 264-65). 
10. The [d]efendant responded, "Yes, sir." 
(R. 234, 264-65). 
11. Deputy Barney then inspected the cab 
area of the vehicle and then went to the rear 
of the vehicle and pointed to the locking 
mechanism of the camper shell (R. 265). 
12. The [d]efendant stated, "Do you want the 
key?" and, when Deputy Barney indicated that 
he did, Bello retrieved the key from the 
ignition (R. 236, 265-66). 
13. An inspection of the camper area of the 
vehicle revealed more than 100 pounds of 
marijuana (R. 268). 
(R. 71-73; see Addendum B). 
Based on the above findings of fact, which defendant 
does not contest, the court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. It concluded that: 
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1. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle 
was pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement 
function. 
2. The officer, upon smelling the odor of 
raw marijuana, had probable cause to believe 
the [d]efendant was engaged in possession of 
controlled substances, 
3. The [d]efendant voluntarily consented to 
the search and there is no evidence of 
coercion. 
4. See Florida v. Bostick, U.S. Supreme 
Court, No. 89-1717, June 20, 1991; the 
[c]ourt clearly authorized [l]aw 
[enforcement [o]fficers to ask questions and 
obtain consent to search. 
(R. 73; see Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Deputy Barney reasonably suspected a possible DUI or 
drowsy driver after observing defendant's truck weave across the 
center line of a divided highway. The record does not support 
defendant's allegation that the stop was a pretext to investigate 
the deputy's alleged suspicion of other, unrelated criminal 
conduct. 
After lawfully stopping defendant's vehicle to 
investigate the cause of the weaving, the deputy smelled 
marijuana coming from defendant's truck. The smell of marijuana 
provided the deputy with reasonable suspicion to detain defendant 
beyond the initial investigative and caretaking purposes of the 
traffic stop. 
The subsequent warrantless search of defendant's truck 
was proper based on his voluntary consent. Defendant's 
allegations of coercion are unsupported by the record. Because 
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defendant has not shown that his search consent was preceded by 
any police illegality, the trial court properly declined to 
engage in an attenuation analysis below. Thus, it is not 
necessary for the State, or for the Court, to engage in an 
attenuation analysis on appeal, 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Waiver of State Constitutional Claims 
Defendant's analysis of the issues raised in his 
appellate brief is based on interpretative fourth amendment case 
law. Notwithstanding his reliance on the federal constitution, 
in Point IV of his brief, defendant broadly asserts that Utah's 
"unique history" compels a different result under article I, 
section 14 (Br. of App. 30-33). However, in so arguing, 
defendant fails to advocate a different approach under article I, 
section 14, than existing fourth amendment law. See State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (state and federal 
constitutional search and seizure provisions are nearly verbatim 
and should be construed similarly except possibly to protect 
state constitutional law from the "vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given the fourth amendment by federal courts"). 
See also State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah App. 1993) 
(rejecting defendant's state constitutional claim for failure to 
offer a separate analysis, or to claim any broader protection). 
Moreover, defendant's "unique history" argument was not 
raised in the trial court and he has not argued "plain error" or 
"exceptional circumstances" that might afford him relief from the 
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appellate waiver normally resulting from the failure to develop 
the constitutional argument below. See State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 920-26 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah App. 1990). Accordingly, defendant's state 
constitutional claims should be deemed waived. State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985); Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922-26. 
B, No Necessity to Analyze Warrantless 
Vehicle Search Under State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality) 
The only arguable exception to defendant's waiver of 
his state constitutional claims is his assertion that the search 
of his truck failed to meet state constitutional requirements for 
warrantless vehicle searches set forth in State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah 1990) (plurality). However, the Court 
need not reach this issue to uphold the warrantless search of 
defendant's truck. Specifically, the trial court upheld the 
warrantless vehicle search based on defendant's voluntary search 
consent and thus declined to consider defendant's Larocco 
argument. For reasons detailed in Point II, infra, the court's 
ruling is correct. It is thus immaterial whether the search was 
also proper under the automobile exception to the fourth 
amendment and/or article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, neither the State nor this Court need engage in 
analysis of the search under the federal and/or state automobile 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL INVESTIGATORY STOP AND DETENTION 
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER 
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to clarify the 
legal standard applicable to the initial traffic stop and 
subsequent detention. Although not challenged by defendant, the 
trial court neglected to expressly articulate the precise legal 
standard relied upon in its findings and conclusions upholding 
the stop (R. 71-73). However, the focus of the parties argument 
below was the existence, or not, of reasonable suspicion to 
support the investigatory traffic stop (R. 29, 44). It is thus 
reasonable to assume that when the court ruled the stop was made 
pursuant to a "legitimate law enforcement function," the court 
implicitly found the deputy had reasonable suspicion to justify 
the initial stop of defendant's truck (R. 73). Accordingly, the 
State will utilize the reasonable suspicion standard in its 
analysis of defendant's allegations concerning the propriety of 
the investigative stop and detention. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
A. Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop if, from the facts apparent to an officer and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the officer would 
reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30; State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992). See also State v. Roth, 
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827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). Accordingly, the reasonable 
suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable cause, 
requiring only "'some minimal level of objective justification'" 
for the stop. United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) 
(citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be 
based on objective facts suggesting that the individual may be 
involved in criminal activity") (emphasis added). In evaluating 
the validity of a stop based on reasonable suspicion, a court 
must consider "'the totality of the circumstances — the whole 
picture.'" Sokolow 490 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). See also Roth, 827 P.2d at 
257. As Sokolow notes: 
"The process does not deal with hard 
certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law cf probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people 
formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders 
are permitted to do the same — and so are 
law enforcement officers." 
Ibid, (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). 
Under these established principles, a stop based on 
reasonable suspicion may serve not merely to seize criminals, but 
also to dispel suspicion and prevent criminal activity. E.g., 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (limited detentions supported by interest 
in "effective crime prevention and detection"); accord State v. 
Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 839 n.l (Utah App. 1992) (Bench, P.J., 
dissenting). Consequently, there remains the very real chance 
that many such stops will reveal no criminality. That 
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possibility, however, does not preclude an officer from 
investigating facts that would warrant a person of "reasonable 
caution" in taking action* Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. See also 
Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-41 (recognizing a police officer's "duty 
to make observations and investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violated"). 
B. Standard of Review for Reasonable Suspicion 
A trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion 
is a finding of fact that will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
clearly erroneous. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987); Svkes, 840 P.2d at 826, and at 837-38 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (Utah App. 1992). But see State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 
13, 14-15 (Utah App. 1991) (applying nondeferential, "correction 
of error" standard in reversing trial court's reasonable 
suspicion determination), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Compare State v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42-43 (Utah App. 
1993) (Bench, J., concurring, joing by Jackson, J.) (arguing that 
Mendoza's standard of review has not been altered by State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)), with State v. White, No. 
920194, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. June 23, 1993) (observing that 
Thurman, contrary to Mendoza, suggests a two step analysis for 
review of a trial court's reasonable suspicion determnation; "the 
final determination of lawfulness of a detention or search is 
reviewed for correctness"). Factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or the appellate court reaches a "definite and firm 
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conviction" that the trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990). 
C. Defendant Fails to Show That The Initial 
Stop of His Truck Was Made Without Reasonable 
Suspicion or Was Pretextual 
In Point I of his brief, defendant appears to challenge 
the trial court's findings in support of its conclusion that the 
traffic stop was justified (Br. of App. at 11). Specifically, 
defendant asserts the court's finding that the deputy observed 
"'no erratic behavior by [defendant's] vehicle while being 
pursued,'" is inconsistent with the court's ultimate conclusion 
that the stop was made "'pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement 
function.'" Id. (quoting R. 72-73) (emphasis added). In so 
arguing, defendant completely ignores the court's preceding, 
additional findings that Deputy Barney stopped defendant's 
vehicle to determine if defendant "was under the influence of 
alcohol, drowsy or otherwise impaired," based on the deputy's 
earlier observation of defendant's "pickup truck driving with 
part of the vehicle in each of two lanes" (R. 71-72). When 
properly considered as a whole, the court's findings are thus 
consistent with its determination that the initial traffic stop 
was legally justified. See State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 
(Utah App. 1991) ("'the ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial 
judge's findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive 
and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision'") 
(quoting 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 2579 (1971)). 
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1. Pretext Allegation Lacks Record Support 
In Point II of his brief, defendant goes beyond his 
initial challenge to the adequacy of the trial court's ruling, to 
assert the stop was pretextual because Deputy Barney wanted to 
investigate "matters unrelated to the stop" (Br. of App. at 13). 
This is so, defendant asserts, because the deputy "observed no 
unusual driving pattern" and thus lacked reasonable suspicion for 
the traffic stop (Br. of App. at 16, 18). Additionally, 
defendant appears to assert that if his truck "temporarily 
straddl[ed] lanes, . . . under extreme canyon winds[,]" that 
straddling did not constitute a "citable" traffic violation; thus 
a reasonable officer would not have stopped his truck (Br. of 
App. at 21-23). Defendant's narrow pretext argument reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the pretext stop doctrine and 
amounts to no more than a challenge to the trial court's 
credibility determinations. 
The pretext doctrine prohibits police from using a 
"legal justification" to stop someone "for an unrelated serious 
crime" for which the police lack the necessary reasonable 
suspicion. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th 
Cir. 1988). As clarified in State v. Cruz, 838 P.2d 83, 84 (Utah 
App. 1992): 
The question posed in the pretext stop 
analysis is whether a reasonable officer, 
considering the totality of the 
circumstances, would have made the stop. 
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 
App. 1992). However, the "officer's 
subjective motivation is not the relevant 
inquiry. Were the officer's subjective 
13 
motivation the key factor, a defendant could 
use this improper motivation as an excuse to 
escape the consequences of an otherwise valid 
and reasonable stop." Id. at 1047 (citation 
omitted). 
838 P.2d at 84. 
Under Cruz and Lopez, defendant's pretext argument, 
which is based entirely on his claim that he was stopped pursuant 
to an improper, subjective motivation of the deputy, fails. 
Indeed, the record is devoid of any indication that Deputy Barney 
was suspicious of defendant for other reasons than the suspected 
DUI, or drowsiness before the stop. Specifically, the deputy 
only determined to pursue defendant after having observed his 
truck weave across the center line of the eastbound highway lanes 
(R. 71, 230). Further, the trial court found credible Deputy 
Barney's statement that he observed defendant's "truck driving 
with part of the vehicle in each of the two travel lanes" (R. 71-
73). The trial court also found that "[d]efendant acknowledged 
he had been having trouble controlling the vehicle due to the 
wind" (R. 72). 
Although defendant seems to suggest that the trial 
court's implicit determination of reasonable suspicion for the 
stop was clearly erroneous, he fails to demonstrate that the 
court's findings should be overturned. Defendant's complaint is 
simply an attack on the trial court's credibility determinations 
— something an appellate court will disturb only in 
extraordinary circumstances. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-
93, 196 (Utah 1987); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 
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1987); State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Those circumstances are 
not present here. 
2. Traffic Stop Proper Based on the Deputy's 
Observation of a Lane Violation, or Weaving 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, straddling the 
center lane markings, or weaving, is a valid basis for a traffic 
stop. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 46-6-61 (1988) (requiring a 
vehicle to be operated "as nearly as practical" within a single 
lane). See also Moreland v. State, 552 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla. App. 
1989) (rejecting pretext challenge to traffic stop where officers 
observed defendant's car speeding and weaving). Moreover, having 
observed defendant's truck weave across the center line, Deputy 
Barney reasonably suspected a possible DUI, or drowsiness. See, 
e.g., State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992) (where 
neither the parties nor the Court expressed any concerns about 
the trial court's ruling that the stop of the defendants' vehicle 
for possible DUI was proper based on the officer's observation of 
the vehicle "drift into the emergency lane and then back into the 
proper lane of traffic"). Accord State v. Marshell, 825 S.W.2d 
341, 347 (Mo. App. 1992) (pretext challenge held "inapplicable" 
where traffic stop based on officer's observation of motor home 
"weaving within its lane of travel," and officer "questioned 
whether the operator was sleepy or intoxicated"); People v. 
Pincus, 584 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (A.D. 1992) ("no basis" for 
defendant's pretext challenge to traffic stop where "officers 
reasonably believed that the defendant might be intoxicated, as 
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evidenced by his weaving over the double yellow line"); State v. 
Guerrero, 401 S.E.2d 749, 751 (Ga. App. 1991) (rejecting pretext 
challenge to traffic stop where officer observed defendant's 
vehicle "weave three times on the Interstate highway"). 
Although windy conditions may have presented a possible 
innocent explanation for defendant's weaving, as noted in part A, 
supra, that possibility alone did not relieve the deputy of his 
duty to investigate his reasonable suspicions of a possible DUI, 
or drowsy driver. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) 
(mandating law enforcement officers duty to stop vehicles 
reasonably believed to be operated in violation of the vehicle 
code). Accord State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Utah App.) 
(Russon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert, 
granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Cf. Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-
41 (recognizing a police officer's "duty" to investigate 
suspicious conduct). Accordingly, a reasonable officer in Deputy 
Barney's position not only would have, but should have effected 
the investigatory traffic stop, if only in the interest of 
safety. See People v. Ouiglev, 589 N.E.2d 133, 136 (111. App. 
1992) (upholding stop of a moving vehicle whose driver had been 
observed berating another driver under the "community caretaking" 
rationale: "The police have a public safety role which the 
fourth amendment permits them to perform so long as they do so 
reasonably and with a minimum of intrusion into the privacy and 
mobility of the citizenry"); State v. Martinez, 615 A.2d 279, 281 
(N.J. Super. 1992) ("'community caretaking function' expected of 
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alert police officers[,]'" used to uphold traffic stop for 
driving at "snail's pace" on the ground that such conduct 
suggested the "objectively reasonable concerns" that something 
was wrong with the car, and/or the driver) (quoting Cadv v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). See also Provo City v. 
Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992) (upholding vehicle 
stop based on report of defendant's possible suicide attempt as a 
valid exercise of officer's community caretaking function which 
the Court limited to those circumstances demonstrating "an 
imminent danger to life or limb"). 
In sum, other than his conclusory allegations, 
defendant makes no effort to demonstrate that a reasonable 
officer would not have stopped a vehicle weaving as was 
defendant's truck for investigation of a possible DUI, or 
drowsiness. Indeed, defendant points to no evidence that it is 
not usual police practice to stop a weaving vehicle for 
investigation of either serious and potentially life-threatening 
activity. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1048-49. CjE. Cruz, 838 P.2d at 
84-85 (pretext analysis "irrelevant and inapplicable" to 
"extreme" traffic violations, e.g., "recklessly speeding in a 
residential area"). As a result, defendant fails to demonstrate 
any pretext in the deputy's lawful, investigative traffic stop of 
his truck. There is no clear error in the trial court's 
credibility determinations and consequent rejection of 
defendant's pretext argument. 
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D. Ongoing Detention of Defendant's Vehicle 
Justified by the Deputy's Smelling Marijuana 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the 
deputy "unreasonably detained [him] following the stop" (Br. of 
App. at 25). Additionally, defendant claims the trial court did 
not address the detention in its findings and conclusions; thus, 
he asserts, "there is no determination for this Court to review" 
(Br. of App. at 26). Defendant's analysis ignores critical trial 
court findings and overlooks dispositive authority from this 
Court. 
1. Detention Standard 
An investigative detention of a vehicle "'must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.'" State v. Hiaains, 837 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)), 
cert, granted. No. 920494 (Utah May 19, 1993); State v. Johnson, 
805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991). See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 
431, 435 (Utah 1990) ("[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, 
conduct a computer check, and issue a citation;" however, unless 
there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the 
traffic violation/ the detention must end). As noted previously, 
in Part C, supra, the initial stop of defendant's truck was 
proper based on the deputy's reasonable suspicion of a possible 
DUI, or drowsy driver. Its purpose was to determine whether 
defendant's driving ability was impaired, or whether there was 
some other, non-criminal explanation for the observed weaving. 
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Defendant's detention beyond this initial purpose was 
justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion of additional 
wrongdoing. See State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 
1992) (an officer may detain an individual beyond initial purpose 
of stop, "only if, during the course of the traffic stop, the 
officer discovers acts which give him or her reasonable suspicion 
of other more serious criminal activity"). Specifically, the 
deputy "caught a whiff of marijuana" (R. 242), when he first 
approached defendant's truck. Recent authority from this Court, 
overlooked by defendant, clearly holds that "the odor of 
marijuana 'has a distinct smell' and can alone 'satisfy the 
probable cause requirement to search[.]'" State v. Dudley, 847 
P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Morin, 
949 F.2d 297 300 (10th Cir. 1991)). See also State v. Naisbitt, 
827 P.2d 969, 972-73 (Utah App. 1992) (same). It necessarily 
follows that the smell of marijuana is sufficient, under the less 
stringent reasonable suspicion standard, to support an 
investigatory detention. Dudley, 847 P.2d at 426 n.l. 
2. Adequacy of Findings to Support the 
Ongoing Detention 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's 
findings are adequate for meaningful review of this issue.1 The 
1
 While the trial court did not specifically address the 
detention issue in its findings and conclusions, defendant's 
challenge to adequacy of the court's written order is answered in 
large part by the manner in which he handled the issue below. 
Specifically, defendant did not clearly raise the detention issue 
until after the trial court had filed its written order denying 
his motion to suppress. And, defense counsel only cursorily 
mentioned the detention in oral argument to the court (R. 285-
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trial court found that the deputy "smelled marijuana" when he 
first approached defendant's truck and "again as he passed the 
camper portion of the pickup as he returned to his vehicle to 
issue [warning citations]" (R. 72). Based on these findings the 
court properly concluded the deputy had "probable cause2 to 
believe the [d]efendant was engaged in the possession of 
controlled substances" (R. 73). Thus, although the trial court 
also found that the deputy determined "[defendant's abilities 
were not impaired due to intoxication or drowsiness" (R. 72), 
those findings in no way detract from the propriety of the 
court's findings supporting defendant's further detention based 
on the deputy's smelling marijuana. 
In short, as set forth in Part C, supra, the trial 
court found the initial investigative stop of defendant's truck 
was justified based on the deputy's observation of weaving and 
consequent suspicion of a possible DUI, or drowsy driver. The 
trial court further found that the deputy smelled marijuana when 
96). Rather, the issue was briefed for the first time in 
defendant's motion to reconsider (R. 102-07), which the court 
denied for the reasons stated in the order denying the initial 
suppression motion (R. 320-21). In thus rejecting defendant's 
argument, the court implicitly found the detention reasonable. 
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (where 
factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the trial 
court but no findings of fact appear in the record, appellate 
court may assume the trial court found them in accord with its 
decision). Accordingly, the trial court's implicit determination 
of reasonableness is adequate for review. 
2
 Although the trial court appears to have upheld the 
detention under the probable cause standard, the less stringent 
reasonable suspicion standard is the correct standard for 
analyzing investigatory detention issues. See Rochell, 850 P.2d 
at 482. 
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he first approached defendant's vehicle. In challenging the stop 
and the detention, defendant fails to acknowledge these critical 
findings and also ignores dispositive authority from this Court. 
As a result, defendant fails to demonstrate any clear error in 
either the trial court's credibility determinations, or its 
implicit finding of reasonableness for the stop and subsequent 
detention. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S TRUCK WAS PROPER 
BASED ON HIS VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
In Points I and V of his brief, defendant asserts the 
trial court erred in finding that he voluntarily consented to the 
search of his truck (Br. of App. at 9-11, 36-37). Alternatively, 
assuming his consent was voluntarily given, defendant complains 
that the trial court failed to determine whether his consent was 
sufficiently attenuated from the alleged illegal stop (Br. of 
App. 37-40). Insofar as defendant's challenge has been preserved 
for review it lacks merit. 
A. Voluntariness Standard 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to voluntary 
consent is valid under the fourth amendment. State v. Sepulveda, 
842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992). M'[W]hether the requisite 
voluntariness exists depends on the "totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances - both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of" police conduct.'" State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 
P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990), in turn quoting Schneckloth v. 
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Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). "[B]oth the 
'characteristics of the accused' and the 'details of police 
conduct' must be considered in determining whether a defendant's 
consent was actually a product of his or her free will." Id. at 
1263 (citations omitted). The burden of proving the 
voluntariness of consent falls on the prosecution. Id. 
B. Standard of Review for Voluntariness of Consent 
In Thurman , the supreme court resolved a split between 
panels of this Court as to the standard of review applicable to a 
trial court's determination as to the voluntariness of a consent 
to search. It held that "the trial court's ultimate conclusion 
that a consent was voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for 
correctnessf;] [however,] [t]he trial court's underlying factual 
findings will not be set aside unless they are found to be 
clearly erroneous." 846 P.2d at 1271 (citations omitted). 
C. Voluntary Consent Finding is Correct 
The trial court made the following findings concerning 
the voluntariness of defendant's consent: Deputy Barney asked if 
he could "look in the vehicle," to which defendant responded, 
"Yes, sir" (R. 73). After searching the cab area, the deputy 
indicated a desire to search the locked camper shell (R. 73). 
Defendant asked if the deputy wanted the key to unlock the shell, 
and then "retrieved" the key from the ignition (R. 73). Based on 
these findings, the court concluded that n[d]efendant voluntarily 
consented to the search and there is no evidence of coercion" (R. 
73). This ruling is correct. 
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1. Waiver 
On appeal, defendant appears to assert his search 
consent was involuntary because the deputy ordered him out of the 
truck upon effecting the stop and smelling marijuana (Br. of App. 
10). Thus, defendant concludes his affirmative "Yes, sir" in 
response to the deputy's search request "was not spontaneous but 
a mere acquiescence to the demands of a police officer" (Br. of 
App. at 10, 40). Also, defendant complains that the court's 
findings are insufficient to demonstrate a lack of coercion (Br. 
of App. 37). Finally, defendant asserts that his search consent 
was involuntary because he "was never informed of his right to 
refuse consent" (Br. of App. 40). 
Defendant failed to present these precise arguments to 
the trial court. In the proceedings below, defendant challenged 
the scope of the search (R. 37), and asserted that his consent 
was not sufficiently attenuated from the alleged, prior illegal 
stop (R. 38-40, 105). During oral argument to the court 
defendant cursorily argued that the deputy ordered him from the 
vehicle; however, defendant's argument failed to articulate at 
what point the alleged order took place, or what effect it may 
have had on defendant's search consent (R. 287). Thus, 
defendant's coercion argument should be deemed waived. State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a defendant fails 
to assert particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained 
evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider 
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that ground on appeal."); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah 
App. 1992) (same). 
2. Allegation of Coercion Lacks Record Support 
Even assuming the Court determines defendant's sketchy 
argument below was adequate to preserve his assertion on appeal 
that he merely acquiesced to the deputy's alleged order to exit 
his truck, it lacks record support. Specifically, defendant 
voluntarily exited his truck and approached the deputy upon being 
stopped. See State's Exhibit #1.3 As a result, defendant has 
failed to pinpoint any error in the court's ruling, or otherwise 
demonstrate that the court's findings and conclusion concerning 
the voluntariness of his consent are inadequate for review. 
3. Attenuation Analysis Unnecessary 
Finally, this Court need not consider defendant's 
additional complaint that the trial court failed to determine 
whether his consent was attenuated from the alleged illegal stop 
under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). See also 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (clarifying Arroyo). As set forth in 
Point I, supra, defendant has not demonstrated that the deputy's 
search request was preceded by any illegality; thus, there was no 
need for the trial court to engage in an attenuation analysis 
below. Accordingly, neither the State, nor this Court, need 
engage in an attenuation analysis on appeal. See State v. 
Harmon, No. 920463-CA, slip op. at 3 n.l (Utah App. June 14, 
3
 State's Exhibit #1 is a videotape of the stop, made by 
Deputy Barney, which was introduced at the suppression hearing 
and reviewed by the trial court (R. 60). 
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1993) (attenuation analysis applies only if a prior police 
illegality exists). The trial court's determination of voluntary 
consent to search should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S TRUCK DID NOT 
EXCEED THE SCOPE OF HIS CONSENT 
In Point VI of his brief, defendant asserts that the 
vehicle Msearch exceeded the scope of his alleged consent" (Br. 
of App. at 40). Defendant asserts that he only consented to a 
search of the cabin area of his truck and that the deputy 
exceeded the scope of that consent by searching the camper area 
as well (Br. of App. at 41). Defendant's argument lacks record 
support and fails to demonstrate any clear error in the trial 
court's findings concerning the scope of his consent. 
A. Standard of Review For Scope of Consent 
Scope of consent is a question of fact. State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah 1990) ("remand[ing] to the trial 
court for evidentiary hearing to determine . . . the scope of the 
consent [to search]"); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 888-90 
(Utah App.) (remanding case to the trial court for rehearing on 
several factual issues, including scope of consent to search), 
cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 
556, 561 n.4 (Utah 1988) (noting that "scope of consent" in 
defamation action is a question of fact). See also United States 
v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Whether a search 
remains within the boundaries of the consent is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances, and 
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a trial court's findings will be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous.") (citing United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 
(10th Cir. 1986)), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 2802 (1991); United 
States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989) (scope of 
consent to search is question of fact subject to clearly 
erroneous standard of review). Therefore, defendant must show 
that the trial court's findings regarding the scope of his 
consent are clearly erroneous. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
B. No Clear Error in Scope of Consent 
Findings 
As noted in Point 11(C), supra, the trial court found 
that Deputy Barney requested "to look in the vehicle" and that 
defendant affirmatively responded "Yes, sir" (R. 73). 
Additionally, the court found that when the deputy indicated a 
desire to look in the locked camper shell, defendant first asked 
if the deputy wanted the key, and then "retrieved" the key from 
the ignition (R. 73). Although the trial court did not expressly 
find that the search was within the scope of defendant's consent, 
it is a reasonable inference from the above findings. See State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (where factual issues 
are presented to and must be resolved by the trial court but no 
findings of fact appear in the record, appellate court may assume 
the trial court found them in accord with its decision). 
Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing or 
otherwise present evidence disputing the fact of his consent to 
the search of his truck. Nothing in the undisputed evidence 
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presented to the trial court even remotely suggests that 
defendant limited the scope of his consent, or that he did not 
desire the deputy to look in the camper shell, as well as the cab 
of the truck. Defendant was present at the scene and had ample 
opportunity to limit the scope of his search consent when the 
deputy attempted to search the camper shell, but did not do so. 
Because defendant took no action to so limit his consent, and 
even provided the key to the locked camper shell, the deputy 
reasonably interpreted the scope of defendant's consent to 
include the cab and camper areas of the truck. United States v. 
Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Pena, 920 
F.2d at 1515 (after defendant consented to search of car, officer 
removed vent panel; this within scope of consent, as at no time 
did defendant "object to or express any concern about the 
officer's activities" and "never attempted to limit or retract 
his consent"); United States v. Peases, 918 F.2d 118, 122 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (search of vehicle trunk upheld on the ground that a 
"[c]onsent to search a car means to search the entire car 
whatever is in it, unless such consent is otherwise restricted), 
cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 2859 (1991); United States v. Espinosa, 
782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 2802 
(1991) (defendant gave permission for agents to "look through" 
car and then "stood beside his car expressing no concern during 
[a] thorough and systematic search" which involved removal of 
back seat and lifting of panel revealing cocaine). Moreover, 
because defendant knew the deputy was looking for marijuana, it 
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is reasonable to assume that both the deputy and defendant 
interpreted the consent as constituting consent to search in 
places where narcotics would reasonably be hidden. Harris, 928 
F.2d at 1118. 
In sum, the deputy reasonably believed defendant's 
consent to search encompassed the camper shell area of the truck. 
Defendant's bare assertion to the contrary fails to pinpoint any 
clear error in the trial court's findings concerning the scope of 
his search consent. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The initial traffic stop of defendant's truck was 
lawful based on the deputy's observation of weaving and 
consequent reasonable suspicion of a possible DUI, or drowsy 
driver. Upon approaching defendant's truck after effecting the 
stop, the deputy smelled marijuana, which smell justified 
defendant's further detention. 
The subsequent warrantless search of defendant's truck 
was proper based on his voluntary consent. The deputy reasonably 
believed defendant's search consent encompassed the camper shell 
area of the truck because defendant made no effort to limit or 
retract his consent. 
Because defendant failed to show that his search 
consent was preceded by any police illegality, the trial court 
properly declined to engage in an attenuation analysis below. It 
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is similarly unnecessary for this Court to engage in an 
attenuation analysis on appeal. 
Finally/ defendant's claims under the state 
constitution have either been waived, or are immaterial to a just 
resolution of this case. Accordingly, this Court should uphold 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S%day of June, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
APR::? ':; 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FILIgD 
APR 2 71992 
ooOoo—•— 
VMary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
James Ronald Bello, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
ORDER 
Case No. 920201-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Greenwood (Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the court upon defendant7s petition 
for permission to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion 
to suppress, plaintiff's motion to dismiss the petition for 
interlocutory appeal, to which defendant has responded, and 
defendant's motions to stay the trial date and for review of a 
video tape. 
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's 
petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order is 
denied because it was not timely filed under Rule 5(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this court is precluded from 
extending that time period by Rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Because the petition is denied, the motions to 
dismiss, to stay the trial date, and to review the video tape are 
moot and we do not reach them on the merits. 
Dated this $^ day of April, 1992. 
Gregory K^CrmBy Judge 
IS Judith M. B i l l i n g s , Judjf§ 
Pamela T. Greenwooa, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAttfftF11107 COURT IN AND FOR THE 
PAGE 
COUNTY OF SEVIER, STATE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JAMES RONALD BELLO, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 1281 
ORDER 
The Defendant's motion to suppress came before the 
Court on the 24th day of June 1991, Don Brou/n representing 
the State of Utah, Ron Vengich representing the Defendant. 
The Court heard the testimony, vieu/ed the video, and 
examined the truck and camper. The Court took under 
advisement the motion to suppress, pending receipt of 
briefs. 
NOW THEREFORE THE COURT makes the following 
findings: 
1. On March 5, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., 
Deputy Sheriff Barney, while traveling west on 1-70, 
observed an eastbound pickup truck driving with part of the 
vehicle in each of the two travel lanes. 
2. Deputy Barney turned around, activated his 
video recorder and pursued the vehicle to stop the vehicle 
and determine if the driver was under the influence of 
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alcohol, drowsy or otherwise impaired. There was no erratic 
behavior by the Defendant's vehicle while being pursued. 
3. Deputy Barney stopped the vehicle after 
catching up with the vehicle approximately two miles from 
the location of the first observation. 
4. Deputy Barney advised the Defendant that he 
had been driving outside the regular lane of travel. 
Defendant acknowledged he had been having trouble 
controlling the vehicle due to the wind. 
5. Deputy Barney observed that the vehicle 
windshield was cracked and also determined that the 
Defendant's abilities were not impaired due to intoxication 
or drowsiness. 
6. The Defendant, upon request, provided a copy 
of the vehicle registration showing the owner to be Bobby 
Randall, dba AC Feed/Grain, 31 Fano A. Arcadia, California 
91006. 
7. Deputy Barney smelled marijuana when he 
approached the vehicle and again as he passed the camper 
portion of the pickup as he returned to his vehicle to issue 
a warning citation for a cracked windshield and weaving. 
8. The offi-cer requested that the dispatcher 
attempt to contact the owner of the vehicle; however, he was 
advised that there was no telephone listed for the owner. 
9. Deputy Barney then returned to the subject 
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vehicle and asked the Defendant: "May I look in the 
vehicle?" 
10. The Defendant responded, "Yes, sir." 
11. Deputy Barney then inspected the cab area of 
the vehicle and then went to the rear of the vehicle and 
pointed to the locking mechanism of the camper shell. 
12. The Defendant stated, "Do you u/ant the key?" 
and, u/hen Deputy Barney indicated that he did, Bello 
retrieved the key from the ignition. 
13. An inspection of the camper area of the 
behicle revealed more than 100 pounds of marijuana. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is ordered that the Defendant1 
Motion To Suppress is denied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial traffic stop of the vehicle u/as 
pursuant to a legitimate lau; enforcement function. 
2. The officer, upon smelling the odor of raw 
marijuana, had probable cause to believe the Defendant u/as 
engaged in possession of controlled substances. 
3. The Defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search and there is no evidence of coercion. 
4. See Florida vs. Bostick, U.S. Supreme 
Court, No. 89-1717, June 20, 1991: the Court clearly 
authorized Lau; Enforcement Officers to ask questions and 
obtain consent to search. 
PAGE 4 
Dated this ^ 5 day of September, 1991 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing COURT ORDER was mailed with 
first-class postage, prepaid, to the following: 
R. DON BROWN 
SEVIER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Sevier County Courthouse 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, UT 84701 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
175 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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